Cut 1 completes the dormant MutationEnvelope contract without changing any runtime path. Bind target_id to the provisioned agent identity, require canonical UUID v4 authorization IDs, cap authorization lifetime at the fleet TTL, and add an unsigned MutationReceipt carrying the audit join.
Server, Agent, and helper share the same canonical bytes, key identity, receipt digest, and Ed25519 golden vectors. Current APT/DNF and Windows execution remains untouched.
Handler/migration counts, calculateBackoff -> calculateDelay, machine-id
binding (cross-platform machineid + fallbacks, not hostname), last-reviewed
dates, and made [[cross-references]] relative so they resolve.
SEC-028 -- a rotated-out server signing key must stop being trusted even when the agent cannot phone home. pubkey.go: bounded stale-cache window on public-key fetch failure; past the window (or when cache age is unknown) it fails closed instead of trusting the cached key indefinitely. Window length is operator policy (command_signing.stale_key_max_age_hours, default 168h/7d) delivered fleet-wide via GET /agents/:id/config; the [1h, 30d] clamp and the existence of the ceiling are doctrine, not knobs. verification.go: CheckKeyRotation refuses when the named key_id is not in the server active set (no primary fallback), and applies the same bounded-stale ceiling to the active-set fetch-failure path so key_id'd commands are no weaker than keyless ones. Server carries the default + 1-720h validation; web surfaces it in Security Settings.
SEC-029 -- the standalone OSV.dev client retries transient transport/5xx/429 with exponential backoff and trips a process-wide circuit breaker after a run of failures, fast-failing to 'unreachable'. Verdict semantics unchanged and still fail-closed; the resilience only stops a transient scanner blip from forcing an operator override.
GATE-004 #4 -- Consumer.ProcessToken holds a mutex so the replay-state guards are never raced by a concurrent caller. Today's single caller (the poll loop) never overlaps; this enforces the one-token-at-a-time invariant for future callers (local-API trigger, retry worker).
RAF/verification/03 and RAF/security/05 document the key-path and OSV changes. ETHOS #3, #4; forward-only doctrine.
