- README: version v0.2.6.8, corrected stale gate claim, updated changelog
- .env.example: merged two competing files into one, deleted bootstrap duplicate
- ErrorBoundary: new component wrapping app, prevents white-screen crashes
- Layout sidebar: version display from /api/health, Docs link to GitHub
- client-logger: debug/trace logger gated behind localStorage.redflag_debug=1,
routes through existing /logs/client-error server endpoint (ETHOS #1)
- All web console.log calls rerouted through client-logger instead of deleted
- Server health endpoint returns version field
- Server accepts client_debug/client_trace in error_type validation
- Dockerfiles: pinned alpine:latest->3.21, nginx:alpine->1.27-alpine,
added HEALTHCHECK directives
- docker-compose: healthcheck blocks for server and web services
- .dockerignore: created to slim Docker build context
OBS-001A: an authenticated /metrics so something other than a human reading
logs can watch the box. no new dep — emits prometheus text straight from the
counters we already keep:
- /metrics behind a dedicated bearer token (sha-256 hash stored, plaintext only
from REDFLAG_METRICS_TOKEN for bootstrap). constant-time compare, rotates
without a restart, disabled by default, never an open route
- exports db pool, taskrunner snapshot, scheduler + queue, breaker state, and
the deferred-advisory count — read live on each scrape, bounded labels only
- settings + migration 054 for observability.metrics_enabled / _token_hash
also fixed migration 046 — it added a column and an index without IF NOT EXISTS
and backfilled off a column it then drops, so it couldn't survive a second run.
guarded every step; the idempotency lint is green again. only the migrations
the runner hasn't recorded see the change, so live dbs don't care.
builds clean, vet quiet, new tests pass.
Fixes 9 auth middleware findings from the A-3 recon audit.
F-A3-11 CRITICAL: Removed JWT secret from WebAuthMiddleware log output.
Replaced emoji-prefixed fmt.Printf with ETHOS-compliant log.Printf.
No secret values in any log output.
F-A3-7 CRITICAL: Config download now requires WebAuthMiddleware.
GET /downloads/config/:agent_id is admin-only (agents never call it).
F-A3-6 HIGH: Update package download now requires AuthMiddleware.
GET /downloads/updates/:package_id requires valid agent JWT.
F-A3-10 HIGH: Scheduler stats changed from AuthMiddleware to
WebAuthMiddleware. Agent JWTs can no longer view scheduler internals.
F-A3-13 LOW: RequireAdmin() middleware implemented. 7 security settings
routes re-enabled (GET/PUT/POST under /security/settings).
security_settings.go.broken renamed to .go, API mismatches fixed.
F-A3-12 MEDIUM: JWT issuer claims added for token type separation.
Agent tokens: issuer=redflag-agent, Web tokens: issuer=redflag-web.
AuthMiddleware rejects tokens with wrong issuer.
Grace period: tokens with no issuer still accepted (backward compat).
F-A3-2 MEDIUM: /auth/verify now has WebAuthMiddleware applied.
Endpoint returns 200 with valid=true for valid admin tokens.
F-A3-9 MEDIUM: Agent self-unregister (DELETE /:id) now rate-limited
using the same agent_reports rate limiter as other agent routes.
F-A3-14 LOW: CORS origin configurable via REDFLAG_CORS_ORIGIN env var.
Defaults to http://localhost:3000 for development.
Added PATCH method and agent-specific headers to CORS config.
All 27 server tests pass. All 14 agent tests pass. No regressions.
See docs/A3_Fix_Implementation.md and docs/Deviations_Report.md
(DEV-020 through DEV-022).
Complete RedFlag codebase with two major security audit implementations.
== A-1: Ed25519 Key Rotation Support ==
Server:
- SignCommand sets SignedAt timestamp and KeyID on every signature
- signing_keys database table (migration 020) for multi-key rotation
- InitializePrimaryKey registers active key at startup
- /api/v1/public-keys endpoint for rotation-aware agents
- SigningKeyQueries for key lifecycle management
Agent:
- Key-ID-aware verification via CheckKeyRotation
- FetchAndCacheAllActiveKeys for rotation pre-caching
- Cache metadata with TTL and staleness fallback
- SecurityLogger events for key rotation and command signing
== A-2: Replay Attack Fixes (F-1 through F-7) ==
F-5 CRITICAL - RetryCommand now signs via signAndCreateCommand
F-1 HIGH - v3 format: "{agent_id}:{cmd_id}:{type}:{hash}:{ts}"
F-7 HIGH - Migration 026: expires_at column with partial index
F-6 HIGH - GetPendingCommands/GetStuckCommands filter by expires_at
F-2 HIGH - Agent-side executedIDs dedup map with cleanup
F-4 HIGH - commandMaxAge reduced from 24h to 4h
F-3 CRITICAL - Old-format commands rejected after 48h via CreatedAt
Verification fixes: migration idempotency (ETHOS #4), log format
compliance (ETHOS #1), stale comments updated.
All 24 tests passing. Docker --no-cache build verified.
See docs/ for full audit reports and deviation log (DEV-001 to DEV-019).
