Tags now cross only after the release gates. Public assets are read back anonymously and hashed; the Rust Action pin now names its advertised stable commit.
from-source builds have no business pulling a 9GB MSVC sysroot for one Tauri
exe. CI builds it once; the server image downloads the signed artifact and
hash-checks it against the manifest. no release / offline -> no tray, server
404-skips. also: make rebuild/up/down/logs so `up -d build` stops biting.
dep-scan.sh: capture govulncheck's real exit code and feed the reachability gate only on exit 0 (clean) or 3 (vulns found). Any other exit (crash, timeout, 137) is now INFRA, so a truncated-but-parseable JSON stream can no longer parse clean and yield a falsely attested posture. npm ci / npm audit / cargo audit stderr is captured and surfaced on failure (no more 2>/dev/null).
Dockerfile: the posture-builder stage no longer curl|sh's rustup.rs. The Rust toolchain is COPY --from=rust:1-bookworm (canonical official image, same base as desktop-builder) with RUSTUP_HOME/CARGO_HOME set -- stronger provenance than TLS-TOFU rustup, no pipe-to-shell inside the stage that produces the attestation. docker compose build will validate the new layer.
linux.sh.tmpl: guard the posture check under set -e so an un-attested (exit 3) or blocked (exit 4) verdict degrades honestly instead of aborting the install before POSTURE_RC is captured.
ETHOS #1 (errors are history), #3 (assume failure). CI-002 + CI-003.
4-octet isn't valid semver, so Tauri's build refused it — cargo build died
before it started. desktop/Cargo.toml is the single source now; the release
gate and bump-version stop touching the field.
dep-scan.sh gates go/npm/cargo on push and bakes an attested posture into the
release — embedded in the server, signed into the manifest. Reasoning and the
two Moby exceptions are in SECURITY.md.
(posture-builder runs rustup; bookworm's cargo is too old for cargo-audit.)
INSTALL-001: manifest schema with components+artifacts, CI generation
in release gate, manifest-driven install template with --guided and
--checkoff modes, post-install provisioning checks, desktop joins
version lockstep (bump-version.sh + CI build + gate enforcement).
Setup.tsx reduced to primitives (FormSection, TextField, Alert).
ci.yml: vet, race tests, clippy, full web build, AI-attribution and
action-pin enforcement. release.yml: gate job verifies tag against
versions.go/docker-compose/Cargo/CHANGELOG, forward-only and on public,
before anything builds; web UI staged into the embed path (gitignored
dist made a bare go build ship an empty dashboard); binaries and docker
image must self-report the tag; release created via Gitea's own API.
scripts/release.sh is the operator path: checks runner, secret, branch,
versions, changelog — asks before every mutation, watches the run after.
bump-version.sh gains current-version display, dirty-tree warning,
duplicate check, changelog check, confirmation. build-secure-agent.sh
retired (bare go build, no version injection, single Makefile caller).
FEAT-003 core (design: RAF/security/06-standalone-authority.md, approved
2026-06-10). On a host with no fleet server, the trust boundary preserved is
root-vs-unprivileged: a root-owned 0600 Ed25519 key signs capability tokens
via a new privileged helper invocation; redflag-local membership lets you
request a mint, never perform one.
Helper gains the mint subcommand: validates forward-only ops, mintable-type
allowlist (no agent-self), host agent-id bind, closure shape (64-hex sha256
fail-closed), hard-coded 15-minute gate-evidence freshness with future-dating
rejection, override-reason requirement for vulnerable/unreachable/overridden
verdicts, duplicate request_id dedupe, journal-before-emission. --init-key /
--retire-key manage the authority lifecycle (retire = the fleet-join swap).
Deny taxonomy 22-25. Round-trip test proves a minted token passes the execute
path's own verification and parses as the wire CapabilityToken.
Agent gains POST /v1/actions/approve-update (single-flight, 409/503 mapping):
fleet-mode refusal, dnf/apt dry-run closure resolve + hash pin (no pin, no
mint), best-effort OSV.dev closure check with honest verdicts (unreachable is
never silent-clear), mint via sudo systemd-run mirroring the execute grant,
then the unchanged verify+execute path. Provisioning script sets up the
journal dir (root:redflag-local 2750 setgid), mint request dir, key init, and
the pinned mint sudoers line.
Complete RedFlag codebase with two major security audit implementations.
== A-1: Ed25519 Key Rotation Support ==
Server:
- SignCommand sets SignedAt timestamp and KeyID on every signature
- signing_keys database table (migration 020) for multi-key rotation
- InitializePrimaryKey registers active key at startup
- /api/v1/public-keys endpoint for rotation-aware agents
- SigningKeyQueries for key lifecycle management
Agent:
- Key-ID-aware verification via CheckKeyRotation
- FetchAndCacheAllActiveKeys for rotation pre-caching
- Cache metadata with TTL and staleness fallback
- SecurityLogger events for key rotation and command signing
== A-2: Replay Attack Fixes (F-1 through F-7) ==
F-5 CRITICAL - RetryCommand now signs via signAndCreateCommand
F-1 HIGH - v3 format: "{agent_id}:{cmd_id}:{type}:{hash}:{ts}"
F-7 HIGH - Migration 026: expires_at column with partial index
F-6 HIGH - GetPendingCommands/GetStuckCommands filter by expires_at
F-2 HIGH - Agent-side executedIDs dedup map with cleanup
F-4 HIGH - commandMaxAge reduced from 24h to 4h
F-3 CRITICAL - Old-format commands rejected after 48h via CreatedAt
Verification fixes: migration idempotency (ETHOS #4), log format
compliance (ETHOS #1), stale comments updated.
All 24 tests passing. Docker --no-cache build verified.
See docs/ for full audit reports and deviation log (DEV-001 to DEV-019).
