RedFlag/.gitea/allowed_signers
Fimeg 67e26be2d9 projection: begin the exact-path public epoch
The public tree and its history contain only the listed paths. Earlier projection history remains preserved internally.

Source-Sha: 913fde029b935671833254797f0f20f1eb9fabba

Policy-Sha: 913fde029b935671833254797f0f20f1eb9fabba

Tree-Digest: 180ae530c1058a2a5c89837bdce2d323ae83e669e38590ca72e75b8d92b7262f
2026-09-08 21:59:33 -04:00

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814 B
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# Keys authorised to sign RedFlag release tags. The version gate in
# .gitea/workflows/release.yml verifies the tag against this file and nothing
# else, so this list is the whole of the release-signing authority.
#
# This key signs tags and does nothing else: it is absent from ~/.ssh/config,
# from every authorized_keys, and from any transport path. A key that opens a
# host should never also vouch for a release.
#
# Rotation: add the incoming key on its own line, cut one release that both
# keys can verify, then delete the outgoing line. ssh(1) allowed_signers also
# accepts valid-after= and valid-before= options when a key should lapse on a
# date rather than on a release.
casey.tunturi@gmail.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIMLaHSap8O8lqv1ipvXC8F0QFBqAZF66Ombe/Ep8kX8M RedFlag release signing