RedFlag/.gitea/workflows/ci.yml

name: ci
on:
  push:
    branches: [main, public]
  pull_request:
    branches: [main, public]
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
      custody_admission:
        description: Stage a synthetic candidate for non-publishing internal admission
        type: boolean
        default: false
      publish_source:
        description: Explicitly publish the current internal public projection
        type: boolean
        default: false
      public_projection_sha:
        description: Exact 40-character internal public SHA authorized for publication
        type: string
        default: ""

jobs:
  release-contract:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    container:
      image: debian:13-slim@sha256:d7e12182ce18b85b93007c1dedf31f2d29e01ccf3182cc4017c709b6259bc132
    steps:
      - name: Install distro runtime
        run: apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ca-certificates curl git nodejs python3
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - name: Verify candidate policy and custody rejection
        run: python3 scripts/test-release-contract.py -v
      - name: Stage synthetic custody admission fixture
        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event.inputs.custody_admission == 'true'
        env:
          PACKAGE_WRITE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PACKAGE_WRITE_TOKEN }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          python3 scripts/test-release-contract.py --export-fixture admission-fixture
          scripts/stage-release-candidate.sh admission-fixture artifacts "admission-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}"
          echo "ADMISSION_SHELF_VERSION=admission-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}"

  go-vet:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
        with:
          go-version-file: agent/go.mod
          cache: true
      - name: go vet (server)
        run: cd server && go vet ./...
      - name: go vet (agent)
        run: cd agent && go vet ./...

  go-test:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
        with:
          go-version-file: agent/go.mod
          cache: true
      - name: go test -race (server)
        run: cd server && go test -race -count=1 ./...
      - name: go test -race (agent)
        run: cd agent && go test -race -count=1 ./...

  rust-test:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@4360b52568e2003a75bf9bc1d59f33a8e3fc893c # stable
        with:
          components: clippy
      - name: cargo test
        run: cd helper && cargo test
      - name: Check package-managed binary update refusal
        run: cd helper && REDFLAG_PACKAGE_BIN_DIR=/usr/bin cargo test --locked package_managed_binary_updates
      - name: cargo clippy
        run: cd helper && cargo clippy -- -D warnings

  # Cross-compile check: does it build for every target platform?
  # Tests run only on native linux-amd64 above; this catches portability
  # regressions (cfg(target_os), FFI, path assumptions) without needing
  # a runner per OS.
  cross-compile:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    strategy:
      fail-fast: false
      matrix:
        include:
          - goos: linux
            goarch: arm64
            rust_target: aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
            linker: gcc-aarch64-linux-gnu
            use_zigbuild: false
            skip_helper: false
          - goos: windows
            goarch: amd64
            rust_target: ""
            linker: gcc-mingw-w64-x86-64
            use_zigbuild: false
            skip_helper: true
          - goos: darwin
            goarch: arm64
            rust_target: aarch64-apple-darwin
            linker: ""
            use_zigbuild: true
            skip_helper: false
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
        with:
          go-version-file: agent/go.mod
          cache: true
      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@4360b52568e2003a75bf9bc1d59f33a8e3fc893c # stable
        with:
          targets: ${{ matrix.rust_target }}

      - name: Install cross-linker
        if: matrix.linker != ''
        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ${{ matrix.linker }}

      - name: Install cargo-zigbuild
        if: matrix.use_zigbuild
        run: pip3 install --break-system-packages cargo-zigbuild

      - name: Cross-compile Go (server)
        env:
          GOOS: ${{ matrix.goos }}
          GOARCH: ${{ matrix.goarch }}
          CGO_ENABLED: "0"
        run: cd server && go build -o /dev/null ./cmd/server/

      - name: Cross-compile Go (agent)
        env:
          GOOS: ${{ matrix.goos }}
          GOARCH: ${{ matrix.goarch }}
          CGO_ENABLED: "0"
        run: cd agent && go build -o /dev/null ./cmd/agent/

      - name: Cross-compile Rust (helper)
        if: "!matrix.skip_helper"
        run: |
          cd helper
          if [ "${{ matrix.use_zigbuild }}" = "true" ]; then
            cargo zigbuild --release --target ${{ matrix.rust_target }}
          else
            cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.rust_target }}
          fi

  web-build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
        with:
          node-version: 20
          cache: npm
          cache-dependency-path: web/package-lock.json
      # npm run build = tsc && vite build — type errors and bundling failures
      # both surface here, not at release time.
      - name: Build web UI
        run: cd web && npm ci && npm run build

  desktop-check:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
        with:
          go-version-file: agent/go.mod
          cache: true
      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@4360b52568e2003a75bf9bc1d59f33a8e3fc893c # stable
      - name: Install Qt 6 build dependencies
        run: |
          sudo apt-get update -qq
          sudo apt-get install -y -qq qt6-base-dev qt6-declarative-dev qt6-declarative-dev-tools libgl1-mesa-dev
      # A release build subsumes the old `cargo check` and leaves behind
      # something a human can install. Nothing else in CI emitted a Desktop
      # binary, so a one-line fix could only be tried by cutting a release tag.
      - name: Build native RedFlag Desktop
        run: cd desktop && cargo build --release --locked
      - name: Prove the binary links and names its version
        run: desktop/target/release/redflag-desktop --version
      - name: Package the matching Linux Agent, helper and Desktop
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          VERSION=$(desktop/target/release/redflag-desktop --version | awk '{sub(/^v/, "", $2); print $2}')
          mkdir -p dist
          (cd agent && go build -trimpath -ldflags "-X github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag/agent/internal/version.Version=$VERSION" -o ../dist/redflag-agent-linux-amd64 ./cmd/agent)
          (cd helper && REDFLAG_PACKAGE_BIN_DIR=/usr/bin REDFLAG_RELEASE_VERSION="$VERSION" cargo build --release --locked)
          cp helper/target/release/redflag-helper dist/redflag-helper-linux-amd64
          cp desktop/target/release/redflag-desktop dist/redflag-desktop-linux-amd64
          bash installer/linux/build-deb.sh --version "$VERSION" --bindir dist --outdir dist
          bash installer/linux/inspect-deb.sh "dist/redflag_${VERSION}_amd64.deb" --version "$VERSION"
          sha256sum dist/redflag_*_amd64.deb > dist/desktop-package.sha256
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@ff15f0306b3f739f7b6fd43fb5d26cd321bd4de5 # v3
        with:
          name: redflag-desktop-linux-amd64-package
          path: |
            dist/redflag_*_amd64.deb
            dist/desktop-package.sha256
          if-no-files-found: error
          retention-days: 30
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@ff15f0306b3f739f7b6fd43fb5d26cd321bd4de5 # v3
        with:
          name: redflag-desktop-linux-amd64
          path: desktop/target/release/redflag-desktop
          retention-days: 30

  installer-integrity:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
        with:
          go-version-file: agent/go.mod
          cache: true
      - name: Install template integrity
        run: cd server && go test -run 'TestInstallTemplateRenders|TestFreshInstallConfigKeys|TestInstallTemplateScriptletSyntax' -v -count=1 ./internal/services/

  # Dependency vulnerability scanning — RedFlag held to the supply-chain standard
  # it enforces on the fleet. Tools installed directly (no third-party actions) so
  # the socket-mounted runner's surface stays small. Go is reachability-gated via a
  # documented allowlist (.govulncheck-allow, mirrored in SECURITY.md); npm gates the
  # production tree and treats dev-only advisories as warnings; cargo gates outright.
  dep-scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
        with:
          go-version-file: agent/go.mod
          cache: true
      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
        with:
          node-version: 20
          cache: npm
          cache-dependency-path: web/package-lock.json
      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@4360b52568e2003a75bf9bc1d59f33a8e3fc893c # stable

      # Provenance first: record the substrate even if a later scan fails the job.
      # "Are we using hacked programs to build it?" — this is how we SEE the answer.
      # Floor enforcement (fail on an out-of-date engine/toolchain) is the next layer.
      - name: Record build substrate
        run: |
          {
            echo "## Build substrate"
            echo '```'
            echo "go:     $(go version)"
            echo "rustc:  $(rustc --version)"
            echo "cargo:  $(cargo --version)"
            echo "node:   $(node --version)"
            echo "npm:    $(npm --version)"
            echo "docker: $(docker version --format '{{.Server.Version}}' 2>&1 || echo 'no engine reachable')"
            echo "runner: ${RUNNER_NAME:-unknown} / $(uname -srm)"
            echo '```'
          } | tee -a "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY:-/dev/stdout}"

      # Scanners run latest on purpose — an old scanner misses new advisories.
      - name: Install scanners
        run: |
          go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
          cargo install cargo-audit --locked

      # One audited script gates Go (reachability + allowlist), web (prod tree),
      # and the Rust helper. release.yml runs the same script with --posture-out
      # to emit the attested posture — CI and release can't drift on the verdict.
      - name: Dependency gate
        run: scripts/dep-scan.sh

  commit-voice:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      - name: Test and enforce the public commit voice
        run: |
          python3 -m unittest discover -s .publication -p 'test_commit_voice.py'
          if [ "${{ github.ref }}" = "refs/heads/public" ] || [ "${{ github.base_ref }}" = "public" ]; then
            RANGE="${{ github.sha }}"
          elif [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "pull_request" ]; then
            RANGE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}..${{ github.sha }}"
          else
            RANGE="${{ github.event.before }}..${{ github.sha }}"
            # A manual re-run carries no before sha, and neither does a first
            # push. Checking HEAD alone would let one clean tip commit launder
            # the history behind it and report green, so both fall back to a
            # window rather than a single commit.
            if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "workflow_dispatch" ] || \
               [ "${{ github.event.before }}" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
              RANGE="$(git rev-list --max-count=10 HEAD | tail -1)^..HEAD"
              git rev-parse --verify "${RANGE%%..*}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || RANGE="HEAD"
            fi
          fi
          python3 .publication/commit_voice.py --range "$RANGE" \
            --allowlist .publication/commit-voice-allowlist.json \
            --repository Fimeg/RedFlag

  action-pins:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
      - name: Check for floating action refs
        run: |
          if grep -rE 'uses:.*@(v[0-9]+|stable|main|master)(\s|$)' .gitea/workflows/; then
            echo "::error::Floating action refs found — run scripts/update-action-pins.sh"
            exit 1
          fi
          echo "All action refs are SHA-pinned."

  public-history:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/public' || github.base_ref == 'public'
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      - name: Fetch pinned gitleaks
        run: |
          command -v curl || (apt-get update -qq && apt-get install -y -qq curl)
          curl -fsSL -o /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz \
            https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.30.1/gitleaks_8.30.1_linux_x64.tar.gz
          echo '551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb  /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz' |
            sha256sum -c -
          tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /tmp gitleaks
      - name: Scan complete public history
        run: |
          /tmp/gitleaks git . --redact --no-banner --log-opts="$GITHUB_SHA"
          scripts/check-public-history.sh HEAD

  # Absence of known-secret content is not authorization to publish. This job
  # asks the other question: does this tree belong outside at all. The manifest
  # it reads is the authority for what may cross, and changing that manifest is
  # a public-surface decision that shows up in this diff rather than in nobody's
  # memory.
  public-surface:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/public' || github.base_ref == 'public'
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      - name: Gate the public surface
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          python3 -m unittest discover -s .publication -p 'test_surface_gate.py'
          python3 .publication/surface_gate.py \
            --repo . --sha "$GITHUB_SHA" \
            --manifest .publication/surface.json \
            --out /tmp/public-surface.md
          cat /tmp/public-surface.md
          grep -q '^\*\*Verdict: \(PASS\|REVIEW\)\*\*' /tmp/public-surface.md

  # An internal public push proves that a projection is safe to disclose; it
  # does not disclose it. Publication requires a manual dispatch on the public
  # branch with both the boolean authority and the exact tested SHA. The
  # internal forge remains the only writer, and the result is read back
  # anonymously before any optional downstream moves.
  publish-forge:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    needs: [go-vet, go-test, rust-test, cross-compile, web-build, desktop-check, installer-integrity, dep-scan, commit-voice, action-pins, public-history, public-surface]
    if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/public' && github.event.inputs.publish_source == 'true'
    env:
      PUBLIC_FORGE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PUBLIC_FORGE_TOKEN }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      - name: Publish and verify exact SHA
        env:
          AUTHORIZED_SHA: ${{ github.event.inputs.public_projection_sha }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          : "${PUBLIC_FORGE_TOKEN:?PUBLIC_FORGE_TOKEN is required}"

          expected="${GITHUB_SHA}"
          [[ "$AUTHORIZED_SHA" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]
          if [ "$AUTHORIZED_SHA" != "$expected" ]; then
            echo "::error::authorized projection $AUTHORIZED_SHA does not equal tested workflow SHA $expected"
            exit 1
          fi
          forge_url='https://forge.caseytunturi.com/Fimeg/RedFlag.git'

          # Ordinary publication is fast-forward only. .publication/EPOCH may
          # authorise exactly one replacement, and only of the SHA it names, so
          # the authorisation is spent the moment it is used.
          epoch_replaces() {
            [ -f .publication/EPOCH ] || return 1
            awk '$1 == "replaces" { print $2 }' .publication/EPOCH
          }

          check_publishable() {
            url="$1"
            remote_sha="$(git ls-remote "$url" refs/heads/public | awk '{print $1}')"
            if [ -z "$remote_sha" ]; then
              return 0
            fi
            if git cat-file -e "${remote_sha}^{commit}" 2>/dev/null &&
               git merge-base --is-ancestor "$remote_sha" "$expected"; then
              return 0
            fi
            authorised="$(epoch_replaces || true)"
            if [ -n "$authorised" ] && [ "$authorised" = "$remote_sha" ]; then
              echo "[publish] epoch authorised to replace $remote_sha"
              EPOCH_LEASE="$remote_sha"
              return 0
            fi
            echo "[publish] refusing non-fast-forward public history: $url" >&2
            echo "[publish] remote is $remote_sha; .publication/EPOCH authorises ${authorised:-nothing}" >&2
            exit 1
          }

          EPOCH_LEASE=""
          check_publishable "$forge_url"

          forge_auth="$(printf 'publisher-redflag:%s' "$PUBLIC_FORGE_TOKEN" | base64 -w0)"

          if [ -n "$EPOCH_LEASE" ]; then
            git -c "http.https://forge.caseytunturi.com/.extraheader=Authorization: Basic $forge_auth" \
              push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/public:$EPOCH_LEASE" "$forge_url" public:public
          else
            git -c "http.https://forge.caseytunturi.com/.extraheader=Authorization: Basic $forge_auth" \
              push "$forge_url" public:public
          fi

          forge_sha="$(git ls-remote "$forge_url" refs/heads/public | awk '{print $1}')"
          test "$forge_sha" = "$expected"

          # Fetch the anonymous Forgejo ref back into the checkout. Downstream
          # receives this ref, not the internal checkout ref that happened to
          # produce it.
          git fetch --force --no-tags "$forge_url" \
            refs/heads/public:refs/remotes/public-forge/public
          test "$(git rev-parse refs/remotes/public-forge/public)" = "$forge_sha"
          echo "[publish] Forgejo anonymously serves exact tested SHA: $forge_sha"

  # Downstreams reproduce the anonymously fetched Forgejo ref. They are
  # deliberately best-effort: a missing credential or divergent history is a
  # visible degraded mirror, never a failure of the canonical publication.
  mirror-downstreams:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    needs: [publish-forge]
    if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/public' && github.event.inputs.publish_source == 'true'
    env:
      CODEBERG_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CODEBERG_TOKEN }}
      MIRROR_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.MIRROR_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      - name: Mirror optional downstreams from Forgejo
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          expected="${GITHUB_SHA}"
          forge_url='https://forge.caseytunturi.com/Fimeg/RedFlag.git'
          forge_sha="$(git ls-remote "$forge_url" refs/heads/public | awk '{print $1}')"
          test "$forge_sha" = "$expected"
          git fetch --force --no-tags "$forge_url" \
            refs/heads/public:refs/remotes/public-forge/public
          test "$(git rev-parse refs/remotes/public-forge/public)" = "$forge_sha"

          mirror_downstream() {
            label="$1"
            url="$2"
            host="$3"
            user="$4"
            token="$5"

            if [ -z "$token" ]; then
              echo "::warning::[mirror] $label credential absent; Forgejo is published, $label is degraded"
              return 0
            fi

            if ! remote_sha="$(git ls-remote "$url" refs/heads/public | awk '{print $1}')"; then
              echo "::warning::[mirror] cannot read $label public ref; Forgejo remains authoritative"
              return 0
            fi
            lease=""
            if [ -n "$remote_sha" ]; then
              if ! git fetch --force --no-tags "$url" \
                "refs/heads/public:refs/remotes/mirror-check/$label"; then
                echo "::warning::[mirror] cannot fetch $label public ref; leaving it unchanged"
                return 0
              fi
              if ! git merge-base --is-ancestor "$remote_sha" "$forge_sha"; then
                # A mirror may follow the same epoch the forge just accepted,
                # and only from the SHA that epoch names. Anything else is the
                # divergence this branch has always refused.
                authorised="$(awk '$1 == "replaces" { print $2 }' .publication/EPOCH 2>/dev/null || true)"
                if [ -n "$authorised" ] && [ "$authorised" = "$remote_sha" ]; then
                  echo "[mirror] $label follows the authorised epoch from $remote_sha"
                  lease="$remote_sha"
                else
                  echo "::warning::[mirror] refusing non-fast-forward $label history; recovery ref and explicit alignment required"
                  return 0
                fi
              fi
            fi

            auth="$(printf '%s:%s' "$user" "$token" | base64 -w0)"
            if [ -n "$lease" ]; then
              if ! git -c "http.https://$host/.extraheader=Authorization: Basic $auth" \
                push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/public:$lease" \
                "$url" refs/remotes/public-forge/public:public; then
                echo "::warning::[mirror] $label epoch push failed; Forgejo remains authoritative"
                return 0
              fi
            elif ! git -c "http.https://$host/.extraheader=Authorization: Basic $auth" \
              push "$url" refs/remotes/public-forge/public:public; then
              echo "::warning::[mirror] $label push failed; Forgejo remains authoritative"
              return 0
            fi

            mirrored_sha="$(git ls-remote "$url" refs/heads/public | awk '{print $1}')"
            if [ "$mirrored_sha" != "$forge_sha" ]; then
              echo "::warning::[mirror] $label SHA mismatch after push; Forgejo remains authoritative"
              return 0
            fi
            echo "[mirror] $label agrees with Forgejo: $forge_sha"
          }

          mirror_downstream codeberg 'https://codeberg.org/Fimeg/RedFlag.git' codeberg.org Fimeg "$CODEBERG_TOKEN"
          mirror_downstream github 'https://github.com/Fimeg/RedFlag.git' github.com Fimeg "$MIRROR_GITHUB_TOKEN"