sessiond: read tunnel health from sysfs, not wg show

Found on the phone: the bearer verb reported tunnel "off" while wiufph was up
and handshaking (4.11 KiB received). wg show needs CAP_NET_ADMIN for
WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE and sessiond is a systemd *user* unit, so it gets "Unable to
access interface wiufph: Operation not permitted" and every tunnel reads off,
forever. A daemon that cannot see the instrument it is built around.

/sys/class/net/<if>/statistics/rx_bytes is world-readable and is the same
number without the parse or the privilege; DEVTYPE=wireguard in uevent finds
the interface, and NM removes the link entirely when the profile goes down, so
its presence is the up/down signal.

The endpoint lookup had the same defect. NetworkManager hands wireguard.peers
to an unprivileged caller, and the endpoint is configured as a hostname
(sub.wiuf.net:51822), not the address the old gate hardcoded - so it is
resolved before pinning, and a failed resolution writes no pin rather than a
wrong one.

src/sessiond/bearer.rs

@@ -310,35 +310,50 @@ fn probe_cellular() -> LinkHealth {
     }
 }
 
-/// `wg show` received-bytes is the tunnel's honest instrument. A peer that has
+/// Received bytes are the tunnel's honest instrument: a peer that has sent and
-/// sent and never received is up and deaf, not connected.
+/// never received is up and deaf, not connected.
+///
+/// Read from sysfs, not from `wg show`. `wg show` needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN` for
+/// `WG_CMD_GET_DEVICE`, and sessiond is a systemd *user* unit — measured on the
+/// phone 2026-08-01, it gets "Unable to access interface wiufph: Operation not
+/// permitted" and every tunnel therefore read `off` while one was up and
+/// handshaking. `/sys/class/net/*/statistics/rx_bytes` is world-readable and is
+/// the same number, without the parse or the privilege.
 fn probe_tunnel() -> TunnelHealth {
-    let out = match Command::new("wg").arg("show").output() {
+    let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir("/sys/class/net") else {
-        Ok(o) if o.status.success() => o.stdout,
-        _ => return TunnelHealth::Off,
-    };
-    let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out);
-    if text.trim().is_empty() {
         return TunnelHealth::Off;
-    }
+    };
-    // "  transfer: 368 B received, 5.30 KiB sent"
+    for entry in entries.flatten() {
-    let transfer = text.lines().find_map(|l| l.trim().strip_prefix("transfer:"));
+        let path = entry.path();
-    match transfer {
+        // DEVTYPE is how the kernel names the link's family; NM tears the
-        // Up with a peer but no transfer line yet: it has not handshaken.
+        // interface down entirely when the profile goes down, so a wireguard
-        None => TunnelHealth::Deaf,
+        // DEVTYPE present at all means a tunnel is configured and up.
-        Some(t) => {
+        let is_wg = std::fs::read_to_string(path.join("uevent"))
-            let received_zero = t
+            .map(|s| s.lines().any(|l| l == "DEVTYPE=wireguard"))
-                .split(" received")
-                .next()
-                .map(|r| r.trim().starts_with("0 "))
             .unwrap_or(false);
-            if received_zero {
+        if !is_wg {
-                TunnelHealth::Deaf
+            continue;
-            } else {
+        }
+        let rx = read_counter(&path.join("statistics/rx_bytes"));
+        // Nonzero received is the only positive evidence there is. Zero covers
+        // both "up and ignored" and the brief window after activation before
+        // anything has been sent; both are honestly "not answered yet", and
+        // the settling window is longer than that window, so a transient
+        // cannot produce an action on its own.
+        return if rx > 0 {
             TunnelHealth::Handshaking
+        } else {
+            TunnelHealth::Deaf
+        };
     }
-        }
+    TunnelHealth::Off
-    }
+}
+
+fn read_counter(path: &std::path::Path) -> u64 {
+    std::fs::read_to_string(path)
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|s| s.trim().parse().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(0)
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]

src/sessiond/server.rs

@@ -467,17 +467,44 @@ fn pin_tunnel_underlay(shared: &Arc<Shared>, bearer: crate::sessiond::bearer::Be
     );
 }
 
-/// The peer endpoint address `wg` reports, without its port.
+/// The WireGuard peer's endpoint address, as an IP.
+///
+/// Not from `wg show`: that needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN` and sessiond is a user unit,
+/// so it can only ever report "Operation not permitted" here. NetworkManager
+/// will hand the peer line to an unprivileged caller, and the endpoint is not
+/// a secret — the key on the same line is, which is why only the endpoint is
+/// taken.
+///
+/// The endpoint is configured as a *hostname* (`sub.wiuf.net:51822`), so it has
+/// to be resolved before it can be pinned. That is the one circular step in
+/// this file: if DNS is broken — which is precisely the failure this task
+/// exists to fix — resolution fails and no pin is written. Skipping is the
+/// right failure: a pin to a wrong or stale address is worse than none, and
+/// the tunnel still works over whatever the default route is.
 fn wg_endpoint_ip() -> Option<String> {
-    let out = std::process::Command::new("wg").arg("show").output().ok()?;
+    let out = std::process::Command::new("nmcli")
-    if !out.status.success() {
+        .args(["-g", "wireguard.peers", "connection", "show", "--active"])
-        return None;
+        .output()
+        .ok()?;
+    let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout);
+    let host = text.lines().find_map(|l| {
+        l.split_whitespace()
+            .find_map(|f| f.strip_prefix("endpoint="))
+            .and_then(|e| e.replace("\\:", ":").rsplit_once(':').map(|(h, _)| h.to_string()))
+    })?;
+
+    // Already an address? Then there is nothing to resolve.
+    if host.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().is_ok() {
+        return Some(host);
     }
+    let out = std::process::Command::new("getent")
+        .args(["ahostsv4", &host])
+        .output()
+        .ok()?;
     String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout)
-        .lines()
+        .split_whitespace()
-        .find_map(|l| l.trim().strip_prefix("endpoint:"))
+        .next()
-        .and_then(|e| e.trim().rsplit_once(':'))
+        .map(|s| s.to_string())
-        .map(|(host, _port)| host.to_string())
 }
 
 /// Act on the machine's decision that the session must lock before the panel