0f8fe22ab6
souveraine-admit creates or adopts one account via systemd-sysusers, writes the root-owned mapping health reads, and reports what NSS says afterwards instead of what it asked for. An account belongs to one agent: handing annie's to souvie is refused in both directions, as is adopting a uid >=1000. Binding is by SeedID, not the UUID filename — a mismatch is identity-drift.
127 lines
6.8 KiB
Text
127 lines
6.8 KiB
Text
# CI package recipe for prebuilt Souveraine binaries.
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#
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# The runner cross-compiles first, then makepkg assembles this package. This
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# deliberately avoids compiling on the phone and keeps its agent data outside
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# pacman's ownership.
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pkgname=souveraine
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pkgver="${SOUVERAINE_PKGVER:?CI must set SOUVERAINE_PKGVER}"
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pkgrel=1
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pkgdesc="Sovereign agent substrate — server, TUI, surfaces"
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arch=("${SOUVERAINE_PKGARCH:?CI must set SOUVERAINE_PKGARCH}")
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url="https://gitea.wiuf.net/Fimeg/souveraine"
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license=('MIT')
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depends=('gcc-libs' 'alsa-lib' 'pam')
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options=('!strip')
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backup=('etc/pam.d/souveraine-stepup' 'etc/pam.d/souveraine-sessiond')
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source=('souveraine-binary' 'souveraine.service'
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'souveraine-secrets-binary' 'souveraine-secrets.service'
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'souveraine-machined-binary' 'souveraine-machined.service'
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'souveraine-admit-binary'
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'souveraine.sysusers'
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'souveraine-sessiond-binary' 'souveraine-sessiond.service'
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'souveraine-sensord-binary' 'souveraine-sensord.service'
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'souveraine-sessiond.pam'
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'souveraine-verify-trail' 'souveraine-button'
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'souveraine-stepup.pam' 'org.souveraine.stepup.policy'
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'LICENSE')
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sha256sums=('SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP'
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'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP' 'SKIP')
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# sessiond is built and packaged for both supported architectures. Installing
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# its user unit does not enable or start it; activation remains target-owned.
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if [ "$CARCH" = aarch64 ]; then
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source+=('souveraine-usb-kvm-binary')
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sha256sums+=('SKIP')
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depends+=('wayland' 'libx11' 'libxcursor' 'libxi' 'libxkbcommon' 'libxrandr')
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# The wry host links the system webview, so it only cross-builds once
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# webkit2gtk is in the aarch64 sysroot. Declared only when CI actually
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# produced one: makepkg validates every entry in `source`, so naming a file
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# that is not there fails the entire package — and the avatar must never be
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# what stops sessiond reaching the phone.
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if [ -f "$startdir/souveraine-web-binary" ]; then
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source+=('souveraine-web-binary')
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sha256sums+=('SKIP')
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fi
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fi
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package() {
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-binary" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine"
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sed 's|%h/.local/bin/souveraine|/usr/bin/souveraine|' "$srcdir/souveraine.service" \
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| install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/souveraine.service"
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# Session authority daemon, package-owned on both architectures. The unit
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# points at /usr/bin and package installation does not enable or start it.
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-sessiond-binary" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-sessiond"
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/souveraine-sessiond.service" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/souveraine-sessiond.service"
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# The fallback surface's PAM stack. Root-owned, so package or nothing —
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# the phone's copy arrived by hand on 2026-07-16, owned by no package, and
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# had not been touched since (TASK-76).
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/souveraine-sessiond.pam" \
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"$pkgdir/etc/pam.d/souveraine-sessiond"
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# The wry host, aarch64 only (webkit2gtk in the sysroot is the gate).
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if [ -f "$srcdir/souveraine-web-binary" ]; then
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-web-binary" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-web"
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fi
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# Sensor reporter, both arches. It stopped being phone-only when charge
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# became a source: sessiond never probes the supplies itself, so the
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# reporter is the only thing that feeds charge evidence — and the laptop
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# has a battery.
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if [ -f "$srcdir/souveraine-sensord-binary" ]; then
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-sensord-binary" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-sensord"
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/souveraine-sensord.service" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/souveraine-sensord.service"
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fi
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if [ -f "$srcdir/souveraine-usb-kvm-binary" ]; then
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-usb-kvm-binary" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-usb-kvm"
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fi
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# Hardware button reporter. Every arch: it decides nothing and depends on
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# nothing, and a laptop with a power button is the same shape. Replaces
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# blueline-power-button, which was owned by no package and carried its own
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# copy of the lock-then-blank ordering.
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-button" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-button"
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# Secrets rail (user service, owns org.freedesktop.secrets) and machined
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# (system service, machine identity). Both were hand-copied to the phone
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# and owned by no package — same gap as sessiond.
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-secrets-binary" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-secrets"
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/souveraine-secrets.service" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/user/souveraine-secrets.service"
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# NOT shipping /usr/share/dbus-1/services/org.freedesktop.secrets.service:
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# gnome-keyring owns that path, and two packages claiming the secrets
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# provider is the collision the session-authority doctrine warns about.
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# souveraine-secrets.service already owns the bus name at runtime, so the
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# rail works without stealing the D-Bus activation file.
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# The admission executor. Root-only in use, so it ships 0755 and refuses
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# itself rather than carrying setuid.
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-admit-binary" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-admit"
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-machined-binary" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-machined"
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/souveraine-machined.service" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/souveraine-machined.service"
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# This is the machine-tier daemon account, not Souvie's agent principal.
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# The development recipe already shipped it; keep the CI package—the
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# artifact devices install—on the same contract.
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/souveraine.sysusers" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/lib/sysusers.d/souveraine.conf"
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# Verifies the forensic trail's hash chain. Ships with the daemon that
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# writes it, not in the rootfs overlay: the overlay only reaches a device
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# at provision time, and the phone is not reflashed. Evidence nobody can
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# check is not evidence (DEVICE-STATE-MACHINE.md §11).
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install -Dm755 "$srcdir/souveraine-verify-trail" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/bin/souveraine-verify-trail"
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# Step-up authentication. Root-owned system config, so it can only arrive
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# by package — rootfs-overlay/ reaches a device on flash and the phone does
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# not flash (TASK-28). Both arches: the laptop authenticates by password
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# until it has a second factor.
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/souveraine-stepup.pam" \
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"$pkgdir/etc/pam.d/souveraine-stepup"
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/org.souveraine.stepup.policy" \
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"$pkgdir/usr/share/polkit-1/actions/org.souveraine.stepup.policy"
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install -Dm644 "$srcdir/LICENSE" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/LICENSE"
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}
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